When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces players'strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principals' incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities and the correlation of agents' information: when externalities and correlation have opposite signs, there is a unique equilibrium in which principals share information; when externalities and correlation have the same sign, there is a unique equilibrium with no communication. In this second case, unlike with complete information, principals face a prisoners'dilemma since they obtain a higher total payo¤ by sharing information.
Introduction
We analyze the incentive of competing principals to share the information that they privately obtain from their exclusive agents. Information sharing agreements are widespread in real life: banks and …nancial intermediaries usually exchange information about borrowers; sellers often share with competitors information about demand and costs; retailers commonly report information on the downstream market to suppliers; corporations often disclose information about their management's performance.
The economic literature has shown that information sharing agreements can emerge both to increase e¢ ciency and to reduce competition in oligopolistic markets (Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982; Clarke, 1983; and Vives, 1984) . 1 Pagano and Jappelli (1993) show that lenders exchange information to screen investment projects or avoid opportunistic behavior by borrowers. Lizzeri (1999) and Gromb and Martimort (2007) analyze the role of experts who acquire and disclose information to trading counterparts. Taylor (2004) and Acquisti and Varian (2005) show how sellers can use information on consumers'purchasing history to engage in product customization and price discrimination. Strategic communication has also been analyzed in the 'networks' literature -see, e.g.,
Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009), and Hagenbach and Koessler (2010).
However, all these papers do not consider the source of the information shared by players, and model communicators as black-boxes. Hence, they are silent on the interplay between information exchange and agency con ‡icts within and across organizations, when organizations have to obtain information from their privately informed members. One recent notable exception is Calzolari and Pavan (2006) , who study information transmission in sequential common agency and assume that principals learn information through costly contracting with common parties, and then share it with rivals. 2 In this context, information sharing creates novel e¤ects because information disclosed by one player a¤ects the contractual relationships between all other players. Calzolari and Pavan (2006) focus on non-exclusive contracting, while we analyze the e¤ects of communication when contracts are exclusive.
Exclusivity clauses are common in many real markets (e.g., Caillaud et al., 1995) . Several employment relationships are, by their own nature, exclusive (e.g., because of labor natural indivisibility); supply and franchising contracts in the manufacturing industry are often exclusive (e.g., when retailers of a brand cannot distribute competing brands); procurement, regulatory and …nancial contracts often feature forms of exclusivity. And information sharing agreements are common in markets with exclusive deals. 3 For instance, the growth of information intensive channels in the manufacturing industry is often seen as a mean to facilitate the dissemination of information between competing organizations (Stern et al., 1996) . 4 What are the drivers of information sharing decisions in these contexts? How does information sharing interacts with rent extraction and horizontal externalities across organizations? To answer these questions, we analyze a model with two independent principals who exert production externalities on each other and delegate production to exclusive agents. Each agents is privately informed about his marginal cost of production, and costs are either positively or negatively correlated. Hence, agents'information must be obtained by principals through the design of incentive compatible contracts. Before contracting with agents, each principal simultaneously and non-cooperatively chooses whether to commit to share this information. 5 We identify the main e¤ect of information sharing between organizations. This e¤ect is absent with complete information and is of …rst-order magnitude compared to the e¤ects of communication with complete information. The incentive of a principal to share information depends on the impact that this decision has on the opponent principal's contract, and hence on outputs. With adverse selection within and across organizations, information sharing induces strategies to be correlated, but mainly via the distortions channel. And, because principals want to reduce these distortions, the equilibrium value of communication depends on the interaction between the nature of upstream externalities and the sign of cost correlation.
When upstream externalities and cost correlation have the same sign -i.e., they are either both positive or both negative -there exists a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies with no communication. To see why, suppose …rst that upstream externalities and cost correlation are both negative. By revealing her agent's cost, a principal induces the rival to distort her output relatively more when the …rst principal's agent has a high cost. This is because costs are negatively correlated, and principals choose higher distortions in the states that are (conditionally) less likely. But, with negative externalities, this reduces the …rst principal's expected pro…t because reaction functions are downward sloping and, hence, each principal gains from expanding (resp. reducing) her own production when the rival is ine¢ cient (resp. e¢ cient). Second, suppose that upstream externalities and cost correlation are both positive. By revealing her agent's cost, a principal induces the rival to distort her output relatively more when the …rst principal's agent has a low cost (because costs are positively correlated). But, this is detrimental to the …rst principal because, with positive externalities, reaction functions are upward sloping and, hence, each principal prefers to increase production when the rival's output increases.
By contrast, when upstream externalities and cost correlation have opposite signs there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium in dominant strategies where both principals share information. To see why, suppose …rst that upstream externalities are negative and costs are positively correlated. By disclosing her agent's cost, a principal induces the rival to distort her output relatively more when the …rst principal's agent has a low cost. This increases the …rst principal's expected pro…t because reaction functions are downward sloping. Second, suppose that upstream externalities are positive and costs are negatively correlated. By revealing her agent's cost, a principal induces the rival to distort her output relatively more when the …rst principal's agent has a high cost. This is bene…cial to the …rst principal because reaction functions are upward sloping.
We also show that, in contrast to a situation with complete information where the equilibrium is always e¢ cient, principals may face a prisoners' dilemma when they have to obtain information from agents, since expected pro…ts are always higher with information sharing. In fact, when agents' information is correlated, communication between principals reduces agents'expected rent because it makes an agent's contract depend on the rival agent's type, and a relative performance evaluation relaxes incentive compatibility constraints -see, e.g., Riordan and Sappington (1988) . When upstream externalities are small, this e¤ect outperforms the strategic e¤ect due to correlation among distortions.
We also consider the possibility of implicit collusion among agents. When principals exchange information, the expected utility of an agent depends on his opponent's report. Hence, it may be expected that an equilibrium in which principals share information and agents truthfully report their types is not collusion-proof, since agents may coordinate on an equilibrium in which they both lie about their type and obtain higher rents. However, we show that, when production externalities only a¤ect upstream pro…ts, there exists a system of transfers such that the equilibrium with information sharing is indeed collusion-proof, if there are no side-payments across agents.
Although we develop our arguments in a principal/agent framework, the scope of our analysis is broader. The results apply to any situation involving horizontal externalities between competing organizations, where principals deal with exclusive agents, like procurement contracting, manufacturer/retailer relations, executive compensations, patent licensing, and insurance or credit relationships.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and Section 3 analyzes the case of complete information. Section 4 introduces asymmetric information and characterizes the equilibrium outputs when no principal shares information, when both principals share information, and when only one principal shares information. Principals' decisions to share information are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 considers the possibility of (implicit) collusion among agents and Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model
Players and Payo¤ s. There are two (female) principals, P 1 and P 2 , and two (male) exclusive agents, A 1 and A 2 , who produce outputs q 1 and q 2 , respectively. All players are risk neutral. P i 's utility is
where t i is the monetary transfer paid by P i to A i . We assume that
This quadratic surplus function is commonly used in the literature on information sharing (e.g.,
Raith, 1996; Vives, 2000, Ch. 8). Hence, P i 's surplus is strictly concave in q i . The parameter measures the magnitude of strategic complementarity ( > 0) or substitutability ( < 0) between outputs. A positive implies that principals' reaction functions are upward sloping; a negative implies that principals'reaction functions are downward sloping. We assume that is small, so that expected pro…ts can be computed through a Taylor expansion around = 0.
where i is A i 's marginal cost of production. We assume that agents enjoy limited liability -i.e.,
This standard hypothesis of the screening literature implies that P i cannot use information about j to leave A i with no rent (Bertoletti and Poletti, 1996) .
Information. The parameter i 2 ; is private information to A i ; it can be learned by P i only through a revelation mechanism, and by P j and A j only if P i chooses to share information.
The vector of random variables ( 1 ; 2 ) is drawn from a joint cumulative distribution function with:
The parameter measures the correlation between 1 and 2 -i.e., Pr( ; ) Pr( ; ) Pr( ; ) 2 = .
Hence, > 0 (resp. <) indicates positive (resp. negative) correlation between agents'marginal costs, while agents'costs are uncorrelated when = 0. It follows that Pr( ) = , Pr( ) = 1 and, using
Bayes rule, Pr( j ) = + , Pr( j ) =
1
, Pr( j ) = 1 , and Pr( j ) = 1 + 1 .
To ensure that probabilities are not negative, we assume that: (i) (1 ) if 0, and
We also assume that > > > 0 and that is small to ensure that outputs are positive in all states of the world.
Communication. Principals can share the information obtained from their agents. Following Vives (1984) and Raith (1996) , we assume that principals follow an "all-or-none"sharing rule: they either fully commit to disclose their agents'costs, or they keep this information secret. 6 Once a principal commits to share information, she cannot renegotiate this decision after learning her agent's costs -see, e.g., Vives (2000, Ch. 8) and Raith (1996) for a similar approach. 7 The information transmitted by a principal is veri…able. More precisely, a report made by A i to P i can be credibly shared with P j , and then transmitted by P j to A j -i.e., there is no moral hazard on the principals'side.
Contracts. Principals design contracts to obtain information from their agents and decide how much to produce. Given that principals commit to deterministic disclosure policies before contracting with agents, we can use the Revelation Principle and consider direct deterministic mechanisms in which A i sends a private message m i 2 about his cost to P i . Contracts are secret: P j and A j observe neither the contract between P i and A i , nor A i 's report to P i . 8 When P j does not share her information about j -i.e., A j 's report m j -P i o¤ers to
which maps m i into a monetary transfer t i (m i ) and an output q i (m i ). When, instead, P j shares her information about j , P i o¤ers a mechanism
in which the transfer and the output are also contingent on m j .
Since by assumption agents must obtain a non-negative utility in each contractible state: if P j does not share information, A i 's utility must be non-negative for all m i ; if P j shares information, A i 's utility must be non-negative for all (m i ; m j ).
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows: t = 0: Principals simultaneously and independently choose whether to share information. t = 1: Agents privately observe their costs, and principals'information sharing decisions become common knowledge. 6 In our model, there is no scope for (deterministic) type-contingent disclosure policies; e.g., when a principal commits to only revealing her agent's type when the agent has a low cost. This is because, with only two types, an unraveling argument implies that this policy is equivalent to full disclosure of the agent's cost.
7 Ziv (1993) shows that, without commitment, there is no information sharing in equilibrium. 8 In a regulatory environment, Iossa and Stro¤olini (2012) argue that, by making procurement contracts public, regulators may signal information about demand or costs to potential competitors of regulated …rms. Secret contracts rule out signaling in our model. Equilibrium concept. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). We assume that agents have passive beliefs -i.e., when an agent is o¤ered a contract di¤erent from the one he expects in equilibrium, he does not revise his beliefs about the contract o¤ered to the other agent (e.g., Caillaud et al., 1995, and Martimort, 1996) . 9 
Complete Information
First assume that costs are common knowledge within each hierarchy -i.e., each principal observes her agent's cost, but not the rival agent's cost. In this case, regardless of principals'communication choices, agents obtain no rents. Hence, the two hierarchies act as vertically integrated …rms and our model is similar to the one in Shapiro (1986) , who analyzes information sharing between …rms competing à la Cournot.
We denote by q ( i ) the equilibrium output of A i when both principals do not share information; by q ( i ; j ) the equilibrium output of A i when both principals share information; and by q i ( i ) and q j ( j ; i ) the equilibrium outputs of A i and A j , respectively, when P i does not share information and P j shares information.
Let s i be the information upon which P i conditions the contract o¤ered to A i . Hence, s i = i if P j does not share information, and s i = ( 1 ; 2 ) if P j shares information. Abusing notation, let e q i (s i )
be P i 's equilibrium output, given all possible communication decisions. 10 We start by describing two properties of expected output and pro…t.
Lemma 1 Regardless of principals' communication decisions, P i 's expected pro…t is
and the expected output is q .
In equilibrium, principals obtain higher pro…t if production increases or becomes more volatile, because the indirect pro…t function is convex. Moreover, since outputs are linear in costs, information sharing decisions do not a¤ect expected output -see, e.g., Vives (2000) . 9 See Pagnozzi and Piccolo (2012) for a discussion of the role of beliefs with private contracts. 1 0 Hence, e qi (si) = q ( i) if both principals do not share information; e qi (si) = q ( i; j ) if both principals share information; and e qi (si) = q i ( i) and e qj (sj) = q j ( j ; i) if Pi does not share information and Pj shares information.
Therefore, when choosing whether to share information, each principal simply maximizes the volatility of her own output (given the opponent's communication choice). The reason is that, by allowing P j to learn i , P i can in ‡uence the distribution of P j 's equilibrium output, and therefore her own output volatility, because reaction functions are linear. Hence, ceteris paribus, if e q j (s j ) becomes more volatile, the variance of e q i (s i ) also increases.
Proposition 1 Suppose that 6 = 0. With complete information: if > (1 ), there is a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in which both principals share information; if < (1 ), there is a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in which no principal shares information.
If = 0 or Pr( ; ) = 0, with complete information principals obtain the same payo¤ regardless of whether they share information or not.
Hence, with complete information principals share information only when agents'costs are positively or not too negatively correlated. To see this, suppose that P j commits to disclose j , and consider P i 's incentive to reveal i . Sharing information has both a direct and an indirect e¤ect on the equilibrium distribution of outputs. First, allowing P j to condition her contract on i expands the set of contingencies upon which A j 's output can be conditioned, thus increasing the volatility of output: the direct e¤ect. Second, revealing i also a¤ects the correlation among outputs. If costs are positively correlated, there is a higher probability of either state ( ; ) or state ( ; ), where both …rms produce the same output, which is either very large or very small when principals share information. Hence, the indirect e¤ect increases volatility too. By contrast, if costs are negatively correlated, the most likely states are ( ; ) and ( ; ), where outputs are more concentrated around their mean when principals share information. Hence, the indirect e¤ect reduces volatility.
On balance, with positive or not too negative correlation between costs, there is an equilibrium with communication because the direct e¤ect of information sharing dominates the indirect e¤ect.
By contrast, the indirect e¤ect is stronger than the direct e¤ect with a negative and large correlation between costs. Of course, with no externality ( = 0) P i 's payo¤ does not depend on P j 's output, and learning j does not a¤ect P i 's strategy. The same is true when costs are perfectly correlatedi.e., when Pr( ; ) = 0 -since in this case the output volatility is the same irrespective of whether principals share information.
We now consider the e¤ect of information sharing on total principals'pro…t and e¢ ciency. The next proposition shows that total principals'pro…ts are higher with information sharing than without information sharing if and only if each principal has an incentive to unilaterally share information.
Moreover, since agents' information rents are only transfers among players, maximizing principals' pro…t is equivalent to maximizing e¢ ciency.
Proposition 2 With complete information, principals' information-sharing decisions always maximize e¢ ciency and total principals' pro…t.
Our results are consistent with the general analysis of information sharing in oligopoly by Raith (1996) , who only considers independent or positively correlated types. However, while Shapiro (1986) argues that information sharing unambiguously increases …rms'pro…ts with substitutes, Propositions 1 and 2 show that this is not necessarily true with negative correlation, if is negative and large in absolute value.
Asymmetric Information
Suppose now that agents are privately informed about their costs. Before sharing information, principals must learn their agents' costs through contracting and, hence, they must give agents an information rent in order to screen types. In order to minimize this rent, principals distort outputs away from e¢ ciency. Of course, distortions depend on whether principals share information, which in turn a¤ects the strategic interaction between principals and agents and, therefore, the value of communication.
Since information sharing decisions are public, we characterize equilibrium contracts in the following three subgames: no communication -i.e., when principals do not share information; bilateral information sharing -i.e., when both principals disclose their private information; and unilateral information sharing -i.e., when only one principal shares information.
No Communication
Suppose that principals do not share information. In a separating equilibrium, P i o¤ers a contract that satis…es the following incentive and participation constraints (
As usual, only the incentive constraint of the e¢ cient type and the participation constraint of the ine¢ cient type matter (see, e.g., La¤ont and Martimort, 2002). Hence, letting q e ( j ) be A j 's output in a (symmetric) separating equilibrium, P i solves the following problem
Since at the optimum both constraints bind, P i 's problem is
Because agents' costs are correlated, P i 's beliefs about j depend on A i 's report. Unlike in the complete information case, however, P i must now grant a rent q i ( ) to A i , in order to induce him to reveal his marginal cost.
The necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order conditions for P i 's problem are 11
and
Therefore, a low-cost agent produces the e¢ cient output that equalizes the (expected) marginal bene…t for the principal to the marginal cost, while a high-cost agent produces an ine¢ ciently low output for rent extraction reasons.
Recall from Section 3 that q ( i ) is agent A i 's e¢ cient output when principals know their agent's cost and do not share information.
Proposition 3 Suppose that principals do not to share information. In the unique symmetric separating PBE, outputs are
Moreover, q e ( ) q e ( ) > 0 for 6 = 0 and 6 = 0;
Despite being set with an e¢ cient rule, the output of a low-cost agent still features a distortion with respect to the output with complete information: q e ( ) > q ( ) if < 0, and q e ( ) < q ( ) if > 0. 12 The reason is that a principal expects the rival's output to be distorted downward, and this distortion a¤ects her own output in the-low cost state through the upstream externality: since A j produces a lower output when he has a high cost, if goods are substitutes (resp. complements) 1 1 We will denote by S1 (qi; qj) the partial derivative of S (qi; qj) with respect to qi. 1 2 This two-way distortion has also been analyzed by Cella and Etro (2010).
P i responds by producing a higher (resp. lower) output than with complete information when A i has a low cost. By contrast, when there is no externality ( = 0) the output in the low-cost state is e¢ cient. Finally, expected output is lower under asymmetric information than under complete information because, with privately informed agents, outputs in the high-cost state are downward distorted for rent extraction reasons.
Consider now the equilibrium relationship between and when principals do not share information.
Lemma 2 sign
The e¤ect of an increase in cost correlation on q e ( ) q e ( ) -the output di¤erence between a low-cost and a high-cost agent -depends on the sign of . The intuition is the following. A higher implies that, when one agent's cost is high, his opponent's cost is more likely to be high. Hence, if < 0, it is less pro…table for a principal to distort the output of a high-cost type, thus increasing q e ( ) q e ( ), because with strategic substitutes each principal prefers to produce more when her rival produces less. By contrast, if > 0, a higher increases q e ( ) q e ( ) because, with strategic complements, principals prefer to jointly increase (resp. reduce) production when both their agents have low (resp. high) costs.
Bilateral Information Sharing
Suppose now that both principals share information. Consider a pure-strategy, symmetric, separating equilibrium in which agents truthfully reports their types to principals, who then share this information. Since an agent does not know his rival's cost when he reports his cost, the incentive and participation constraints are
Moreover, the limited liability constraint is
Clearly, when this constraint is satis…ed, the participation constraint is also satis…ed.
As usual, the relevant limited liability constraints is that of the high-cost type
while the relevant incentive constraint is that of the low-cost type
Therefore, letting q e ( i ; j ) denote the equilibrium output, P i solves max fq i (:;:);U i (:;:)g
subject to (3) and (4).
At the optimum, the transfer t i ( ; j ) is such that the high-cost type obtains no rent regardless of his opponent's cost -i.e., t i ( ; j ) = q i ( ; j ) 8 j -and the incentive constraint (4) is binding
Hence, P i 's optimization problem is max q i (:;:)
Notice that, although each principal can condition her contract on her opponent's cost, agents still earn an information rent, because they must obtain a non-negative utility in every contractible state.
The symmetric equilibrium output is determined by the following necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order conditions
As when principals do not share information, the output of a low-cost agent is chosen by an e¢ cient rule, while the output of a high-cost agent is distorted for rent extraction reasons. By condition (8) , this distortion increases with
, which is an index of the informativeness of signal relative to signal on the rival's cost j .
Essentially, a principal imposes a higher distortion on the output of a high-cost agent when the cost of a rival agent takes its less likely value. In fact,
Hence, if costs are positively correlated, the distortion of a high-cost agent's output is larger when his opponent has a low rather than a high cost: q i ( ; ) > q i ( ; ). This is because, when costs are positively correlated, a principal whose agent has a high cost expects the opponent's agent to have a high cost too, and therefore requires a higher distortion when the opponent has a low cost, which is less likely. Similarly, if costs are negatively correlated, the distortion of a high-cost agent's output is larger when his opponent has a high cost.
Recall from Section 3 that q ( i ; j ) is agent A i 's e¢ cient output when principals know their agent's cost and share information.
Proposition 4 Suppose that both principals share information. In the unique symmetric PBE, outputs are
Moreover, q e ( ; ) > q ( ; ) if < 0, and q e ( ; ) < q ( ; ) if > 0;
Expected output is the same when both principals share information and when they do not
The outputs produced when both agents have a low cost are e¢ cient; while the output produced by a high-cost agent is ine¢ ciently low to reduce information rents -i.e., q e ( ; j ) < q ( ; j ) 8 j 2 . Moreover, this distortion induces principals to also distort the quantity produced by a lowcost agent, when the rival agent has a high cost. In other words, when principals share information, there is a strategic linkage between the distortion imposed by one principal and the opponent's cost, because the output chosen by P i depends on A j 's output and, hence, on the distortion chosen by P j .
The distortion in q e ( ; ) relatively to the complete information benchmark depends on the sign of . If < 0, P i induces her low-cost agent to overproduce when j = , because outputs are strategic substitutes and, hence, a principal wants to increase production when the rival produces less; if > 0, P i induces her low-cost agent to underproduce when j = , because outputs are strategic complements and, hence, a principal wants to reduce production when the rival produces less. Finally, expected outputs are the same when there is no communication and when both principals share information because of the linearity of outputs with respect to costs.
Unilateral Information Sharing
Suppose now that only one principal, say P i , commits to share information, while P j does not. Let q e i ( i ) and q e j ( j ; i ) be the equilibrium outputs. In this case, P i 's optimization problem is
while P j 's optimization problem is max q j (:;:)
When choosing contracts, P i takes into account that P j will also condition A j 's output on A i 's report, while P j takes into account that P i will condition her contract only on A i 's report.
The necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order conditions of P i 's program are
and X j Pr j j S 1 (q e i ( ); q e j ( j ; )) = + 1 ;
while the necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order conditions of P j 's program are
Therefore, low-cost agents produce according to an e¢ cient rule; while both principals induce a highcost agent to produce an ine¢ ciently-low output for rent extraction reasons. The interpretation of this distortion is analogous to the interpretation of condition (8) in Section 4.2.
Since P j is able to choose outputs as a function of both agents'costs, she has a competitive advantage relative to P i because she can impose a higher distortion in the states that are (conditionally) less likely. However, as shown in Section 5, this does not necessarily harm P i . Moreover, q e i ( ) > q e i ( ); q e j ( ; ) > q e j ( ; ); and q e j ( ; ) > q e j ( ; ); q e j ( ; ) > q e j ( ; ) if > 0, and q e j ( ; ) < q e j ( ; ) if < 0;
Expected output is the same for both hierarchies and it is equal to the expected output without communication and when both principals share information -i.e., P
The intuitions for the distortion imposed by principals to the outputs of low-cost and high-cost agents are the same as the ones discussed after Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. Since expected outputs are always the same regardless of principals'communication decisions, sharing information only induces principals to reallocate output distortions across states.
Do Principals Share Information?
Consider now principals'decision to share information at time 1. Principals'pro…ts when they choose to share information (I) or not to share information (N ) are where V e I and V e N are principals'pro…ts when they both share information and when they do not share information, respectively; V e I;N is a principal's pro…t when she shares information but her opponent does not; and V e N;I is a principal's pro…t when she does not share information but her opponent The incentive for a principal to disclose her agent's cost depends on how this information a¤ects the rival's output. When = 0 communication has no e¤ect because there is no strategic interaction between principals; hence disclosing information does not a¤ect a rivals' output. By contrast, if goods are substitutes (resp. complements), and sharing information induces rivals to reduce (resp. increase) output in the most likely states, then each principal prefers to share information about her agent's cost. Hence, when 6 = 0, the impact of the correlated distortions e¤ect on the incentive to share information depends on the signs of and .
P i prefers to share information about i if and only if < 0. The reason is as follows. Suppose …rst that > 0 -i.e., costs are positively correlated. When P i reveals information about i , she induces P j to distort the output of her high-cost agent relatively more (i.e., to produce less) when A i 's cost is low (and hence A i produces more) and relatively less (i.e., to produce more) when A i 's cost is high (and hence A i produces less), because the …rst case is less likely when costs are positively correlated. This increases P i 's pro…ts when < 0 -i.e., with strategic substitutes -because P i prefers to produce less (resp. more) when her rival produces more (resp. less); while it reduces P i 's pro…t when > 0 -i.e., with strategic complements -because principals prefer to produce positively-correlated outputs.
Suppose now that < 0 -i.e., costs are negatively correlated. By revealing i , P i induces P j to distort the output of her high-cost agent relatively more (i.e., to produce less) when A i 's cost is high (and hence A i produces less) and relatively less (i.e., to produce more) when A i 's cost is low (and hence A i produces more), because the …rst case is less likely when costs are negatively correlated. This increases P i 's pro…t when > 0 -i.e., with strategic complements -because principals prefer to produce positively-correlated outputs; while it reduces P i 's pro…ts when < 0 -i.e., with strategic substitutes -because P i prefers to produce less (resp. more) when her rival produces more (resp. less).
Notice that the correlated distortion e¤ect is of …rst-order magnitude relative to the e¤ects of information sharing with complete information between principals and agents, where only the sign and magnitude of the correlation parameter a¤ects the value of communication. 13 The equilibrium characterized in Proposition 6 are in dominant strategies -e.g., when < 0 and information sharing is an equilibrium, each principal strictly prefers to share information regardless of what the other principal does. This implies that there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies where principals randomize between sharing and not sharing information.
The next proposition compares equilibrium expected pro…ts when both principals share information and when they both do not share information.
Proposition 7 Principals' expected pro…ts are higher when they both share information than with no communication, while agents' expected rents are higher with no communication than when both principals share information.
Hence, when agents are privately informed about their costs, principals and agents have opposing preferences regarding information sharing. The reason is that, since costs are correlated, communication creates an informational externality that reduces the information rent that a principal has to pay to her agent. This is because, when agents' contracts are contingent on the rivals' types, cost correlation generates a relative performance evaluations e¤ect that relaxes incentive compatibility and makes information acquisition less costly for principals. For small this e¤ect outperforms the strategic e¤ect due to correlated distortions, because upstream externalities are negligible relative to cost of information acquisition.
Since agents'information rents are only a transfer among players and do not a¤ect e¢ ciency, an implication of Propositions 6 and 7 is that, while under complete information principals' decisions regarding information sharing always maximizes total principals' total pro…t and e¢ ciency, uninformed principals may ine¢ ciently choose not to share information, even though they would obtain higher total pro…t by sharing information.
Corollary 8 Principals' decision not to share information when > 0 is ine¢ cient.
Hence, when cost correlation and production externalities have the same sign, principals face a prisoners'dilemma, since they have an incentive not to share information, even if they would jointly bene…t from coordinating on information sharing.
Agents'Collusion
In our analysis, we have assumed that, when A i makes a report to P i , he believes that A j makes a truthful report to P j . However, with information sharing the expected utility of an agent is a¤ected by his opponent's report, because his principal's payo¤ depends on it. Hence, an equilibrium in which both principals share information, and each agent tells the truth expecting the rival to do the same, may not be collusion-proof. In other words, agents may whish to coordinate on an equilibrium in which they both lie in order to obtain higher rents at the expense of principals.
In this section, we consider the possibility of collusion among agents, assuming that agents cannot make side payments. 14 Let t e ( i ; j ) be the equilibrium transfer paid to A i when both principals share information. In order for agents to prefer to truthfully report their costs rather than both lie, it must be that an e¢ cient agent prefers to truthfully report his cost, rather than lie, when his e¢ cient rival lies -i.e., 
But the equilibrium transfers with information sharing are indeterminate in some states, because agents make their reports before learning the rival's type. Hence, the number of constraints that bind in a truthful equilibrium is smaller than the number of instruments available to principals.
Notice that the limited liability constraints of the ine¢ cient types imply that t e ( ; ) = q e ( ; ), for all . Hence, (13) rewrites as 
This implies that agents have no incentive to collude if principals -actually even only one of them -implement a transfer t e ; such that: (i) agents still tell the truth when rivals are expected to do so; (ii) limited liability constraints are satis…ed in all states; (iii) inequality (14) is satis…ed.
Proposition 9
There is a system of transfers such that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4 is robust to the threat of implicit collusion. This system of transfers satis…es agents'limited liability and is such that t e ( ; ) = q e ( ; ) 8 2 ; t e ( ; ) = q e ( ; );
Implicit collusion is therefore not an issue in our model. Of course, this is partly due to the fact that there are no production externalities across agents -see, e.g., Martimort (1996) for a model with this feature. In this setting communication not only creates informational externalities among agents, but it also generates direct production externalities that may increase agents'incentives to jointly misreport their types.
Conclusions
In order to explore the e¤ects of the exchange of information among complex organizations, we have considered two principals who produce externalities on each other, and independently choose whether to share the information they obtain through contracts with exclusive and privately informed agents. Principals' incentive to share information depends on the output distortions generated to induce agents to reveal their information, because information sharing induces these distortions to be correlated. Therefore, the bene…t of communication depends on the interaction between the type of production externalities and the sign of cost correlation. When production externalities and cost correlation have the same sign, there is a unique equilibrium with no communication; when production externalities and cost correlation have opposite signs, there is a unique equilibrium in which both principals share information. In contrast to the case in which agents have no private information, where the equilibrium outcome is always e¢ cient, principals may face a prisoners' dilemma when agents have private information about their costs. Our results are robust to the threat of (implicit) collusion among agents.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. With complete information, principals fully extract their agents' rents. We characterize the equilibrium outputs in the three possible cases: (i) both principals share information;
(ii) no principal shares information; (iii) only one principal shares information.
No information sharing. When principals do not share information, the (symmetric) equilibrium output is q ( i ) = arg max
and the equilibrium transfer, t ( i ), is such that
Hence, a symmetric equilibrium satis…es the following necessary and su¢ cient …rst-order conditions
where S 1 (:) denotes the partial derivative of S (q i ; q j ) with respect to q i . Solving these conditions yields
Bilateral information sharing. When both principals share information, the equilibrium output is
and the equilibrium transfer, t i ( i ; j ), is such that
The …rst-order necessary and su¢ cient conditions are
Solving (A2), outputs in the unique equilibrium are
Unilateral information sharing. Finally, suppose that one principal, say P i , commits to disclose her agent's cost, while P j does not share information. For each i , P i 's optimization program is
and, for each ( i ; j ), P j 's optimization program is
yielding the equilibrium outputs
Expected outputs and pro…ts. Consider now expected outputs in the three cases. Let( ; ) 1 2 . Taking expectations, it follows that
Using conditions (A1), (A2), (A3) and (A4), expected pro…ts are
where the second equality follows because
Proof of Proposition 1. Let V I and V N be principals' expected pro…ts when they both share information and when they do not share information, respectively. Let V N;I be P i 's pro…t and V I;N be P j 's pro…t when P i does not share information while P j shares information.
A symmetric equilibrium where both principals share information exists if and only if V I V N;I . Assuming that is small but di¤erent from 0 and using a second-order Taylor approximation around = 0, we have
Using the equilibrium outputs from Lemma 1, we have
Hence,
Therefore, there is a symmetric equilibrium where both principals share information if and only if (1 ) + 0 -i.e., if 0 or if < 0 and j j (1 ). A symmetric equilibrium where principals do not share information exists if and only if V N V I;N . Assuming that is small but di¤erent from 0 and using a second-order Taylor approximation around = 0, we have
Therefore, there is a symmetric equilibrium where principals do not share information if and only if is negative and su¢ ciently low -i.e., if < (1 ). Because the sign of (A5) is always opposite to the sign of (A6), the equilibria are in dominant strategies for 6 = 0. Finally, if = 0 or Pr( ; ) = 0, information sharing has no impact on principals' pro…ts -i.e., V N = V I;N = V I = V N;I . Hence, principals are indi¤erent between sharing information or not.
Proof of Proposition 2. We compare principals'equilibrium pro…t when they both share information, V I , with principals'equilibrium pro…t when they do not share information, V N . By Lemma 1, V I = V N for = 0 and
4(2 + ) 2 (2 ) 2 > 0 for = 0. Suppose that 6 = 0. Using the Taylor approximations for V I and V N in the proof of Proposition 1,
(1 ) :
This is positive if and only if (1 ) + > 0 -i.e., if and only if each principal strictly prefers to share information. The result on e¢ ciency follows because information rents are transfers among agents and do not a¤ect e¢ ciency.
Proof of Proposition 3. Equilibrium outputs are computed by solving the system of …rst-order conditions (1) and (2). Moreover, P i Pr ( i ) q e ( i ) = 2 and q e ( ) q e ( ) = 2 (1 ) .
Proof of Lemma 2. Di¤erentiating q e ( ) q e ( ) with respect to ,
Proof of Proposition 4. Solving the system of …rst-order conditions (7) and (8) yields the equilibrium outputs with bilateral information sharing. Therefore,
The rest of the proof is straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5. Solving the system of …rst-order conditions (9), (10), (11) and (12) yields the equilibrium outputs with unilateral information sharing. Moreover, the expected output of both principals is
which is equal to the expected output when both principals share information. 
Therefore, there is a symmetric equilibrium where both principals do not share information if and only if > 0. Because the sign of (A8) is always opposite to the sign of (A10), the equilibria are in dominant strategies.
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that both and are di¤erent from 0. Using (A7), (A9), and the equilibrium outputs in Propositions 3 and 4, Consider now agents' expected rents and let U e (s i ) be A i 's equilibrium utility when the information upon which P i conditions her contract is s i ; s i 2 f i ; ( 1 ; 2 )g. Without information sharing,
When instead both principals share information,
Taking the di¤erence between (A11) and (A12), The transfert e ( ; ) satis…es the agent's limited liability constraint in state ( ; ). Moreover, substituting this transfer into condition (14) yields Pr( j ) Pr( j ) q e ( ; ) > 0:
Hence, agents have no incentive to collude when they receive transfert e ( ; ).
